liberalization, shielding declining industries from international competition (Katz 1988) . This is most evident in the agricultural sector, where barriers to trade and investment have fallen more slowly than in manufacturing (Davis 2003) . Taken together, the Japanese government is argued to have engaged in a process of managed globalization in which it has reduced government intervention in manufacturing while continuing to protect a limited number of sectors (Schaede and Grimes 2003) .
In this article, I argue that the constraints liberalization placed on domestic actors were more fragmented than proposed by the retrenchment and resistance hypotheses. Through an analysis of investment in energy policy in Japan, I show that retrenchment and resistance did not exhaust the range of choices available to domestic actors; in addition to retrenching from the use of industrial policies or resisting pressure to reduce industrial targeting, they retained and redeployed state functions to the energy sector, which was substantially unaffected by the mechanisms driving liberalization.
The analysis proceeds as follows. I begin by discussing theories of economic liberalization, with reference to the most important mechanisms identified as undermining industrial policy in Japan. I then introduce the concept of redeployment, contrast it with retrenchment and resistance, and introduce legal, budgetary, and employee-level data to demonstrate the redeployment of state resources to manage energy security and environmental externalities and increasingly to promote sectoral employment and growth. I conclude with a discussion of the findings and their implications for our understanding of the relationship between state-market relations in Japan.
Existing Literature on Economic Liberalization
There is a growing consensus in comparative political economy that governments across the advanced industrialized states retrenched from the application of sectorally targeted policies while resisting change in a more limited number of sectors (Campbell 2004, 125-127) . Retrenchment does not imply a simple reduction in the size of government. Rather, it constitutes a change in the function of government, which increasingly limits itself to monitoring and enforcing the terms of competition (Vogel 1998) .
This characterization of the changes that have occurred in the advanced industrialized states is echoed in studies on Japan. Debate over Japan's postwar political economy can be divided into two periods. In the first, industrial policy was identified as a central feature of Japan's political economy. The effectiveness of industrial policy in promoting growth of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.70.40.11, on 13 Feb 2019 at 03:00:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms remains disputed (Beason and Weinstein 1996) . Yet there is little disagreement that policies targeting manufacturing and other sectors were a core component of Japan's political economy.
In manufacturing, the coordination of interests and implementation of industrial policy was delegated to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI; the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry [METI] from 2001). For MITI/METI, promoting national competitiveness was central to its organizational mission (Johnson 1982) . Industrial policy applied a standard set of policies across sectors. Industries designated as strategic were supported through quotas and tariffs, subsidies, controls over the terms of inward investment through technology licensing, and the relaxation of competition rules (Katz 1988) . In the immediate years following defeat in war, industrial policy focused on promoting coal and steel in order to aid economic recovery. This broadened in the late 1950s to include a wider range of industries, such as synthetic fibers, petrochemicals, autos, shipbuilding, machine parts, and electronics, with the goals of accelerating economic growth and achieving full employment (Kosai 1988) . 1 Scholars moved on in the second period to argue that the government either retrenched from the application of industrial policy or resisted liberalization in a limited number of sectors. Industrial policy was undermined by three mechanisms, each of which lowered the barriers to entry in the Japanese economy. The first is Japan's participation in international regimes governing trade and capital flows. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) drew Japan into the multilateral rules governing trade in goods and services and capital flows. This limited the instruments available to support the competitiveness of a wide range of industries. Through ongoing rounds of negotiations, Japan liberalized barriers to trade. As a result, Japanese tariff rates across product groups fell markedly; significant liberalization of trade began in 1961, and average tariff rates stood at 4 percent at the end of the Tokyo Round in 1982 (Searight 1999,58) . Capital controls also fell as Japan gained membership in the IMF. Japan liberalized foreign exchange transactions in 1964-in accordance with Article 8 of the IMF, which obliges countries to abolish restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions and on the convertibility of the currency-and gradually liberalized controls over capital transactions (Tsuruta 1988, 54) . This further reduced the formal powers available to support targeted industries.
A second mechanism driving the abandonment of industrial policy was pressure from bilateral trading partners, most importantly the United of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633
States. This served to constrain the range of client industries supported through sectoral targeting of manufacturing. The United States used bilateral negotiations, in addition to multilateral forums, to pressure the Japanese government to lower barriers to market entry. US initiatives to restrict the application of industrial policy began in the 1950s in the textiles sector and expanded to include steel, semiconductors, and autos. Negotiations were formalized through the Structural Impediments Initiative, which addressed land use policies, competition policy, and sectoral problems identified by US authorities as representing barriers to market entry within Japan, and then through the Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy (Schoppa 1992; Mulgan 1997) .
The two drivers of liberalization I have summarized are associated with forces external to Japan's political economy. A third relates to changes within the Japanese economy itself. The cooperation of firms in client industries was likely under conditions of capital scarcity. Falling barriers to capital flows, driven both by the Japanese government's compliance with IMF requirements and pressure from firms responding to a higher yen, made firms less reliant on domestic capital (Hoshi and Kashyap 1999) . This made firms in internationally competitive sectors less reliant on government policy (Alexander 2008; Katz 1988) . Bankcentered finance, a hallmark of Japanese industrial policy under conditions of closed capital markets, fell as a share of firm financing as a result. In the area of high technology, consumer electronics firms also became less compliant with MITI/METI industrial planning as they internationalized and became less reliant on public finances and protection in order to compete (CalIon 1995) . Institutional Change: Retrench, Resist, or Retain and Redeploy Economic liberalization is an institutional phenomenon that implies changes in the laws, regulations, and policies used to govern economic markets (Streeck and Thelen 2004) . Retrenchment is therefore associated with changes in the laws enabling sectoral growth policies and a reduction in the range of economic sectors targeted by the tools of industrial policy.
Patterns of
Data support the contention that the government retrenched from industrial policy. The most comprehensive examination of sectoral targeting in Japan is conducted by Saadia Pekkanen (2003) . She finds a significant fall over time in terms of both the range of sectors being supported and the magnitude of that support. Prior to 1970, the auto, airof use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.70.40.11, on 13 Feb 2019 at 03:00:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms craft, and shipbuilding sectors were targeted, as were the computer and semiconductor industries. By the 1980s, these industries no longer obtained significant levels of support.
Further evidence in favor of the retrenchment hypothesis lies in institutional changes within the lead ministry responsible for implementing industrial policy in manufacturing. The number of internal bureaus focused on sector-specific targeting fell over time, relative to those focused on macroeconomic policy and trade. Most importantly, bureaus managing specific sectors of the economy were merged as part of the reorganization of Japan's ministries and agencies completed in 2001, while horizontal bureaus dealing with macroeconomic and trade policy and the services sector expanded (Namura 1991; Ihara 2010) .
There is also evidence to support the resistance hypothesis. AureliaGeorge notes, for example, that a coalition of legislators, technocrats, and farmers slowed liberalization in the agricultural sector. Leonard Schoppa finds that US pressure forced retrenchment when domestic coalitions supported this outcome but achieved limited results in sectors such as retail where there was strong opposition from domestic interests (Schoppa 1992) . Over time this meant that support shifted to focus on protecting firms and industries that were less competitive internationally (Calder 1988; Lincoln 2001) .
In this section, I argue that retrenchment and resistance do not account for the full range of institutional changes that have occurred in Japan. Instead, I propose that institutional changes in Japan's political economy consist not only of retrenchment and resistance but also of retention and redeployment. Following James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2009, 36) , I define redeployment as "the adoption of new goals or the incorporation of new groups into the coalitions on which institutions are founded." Redeployment is possible, I argue, because the pressures for liberalization are fragmented. This means that intervention in favor of specific sectors remains possible in areas unaffected by mechanisms driving liberalization (Schaede and Grimes 2003, 7) . It also means that while governments may retrench from sectoral targeting in response to external and internal political pressures, they can also retain and redeploy resources in order to shape public policy in favor of sector-specific goals.
There are good reasons to expect domestic actors to seek to retain and redeploy resources from areas of government retrenchment toward those that remain insulated: organizations such as MITI/METI have strong interests in maximizing budgetary allocations, and firms that benefit from subsidies are also likely to support ongoing intervention if this increases of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633 profitability. Retention and redeployment is likely to occur, I argue, under two conditions: when particular sectors of the economy are insulated from the specific mechanisms driving retrenchment; and when there remain coalitions of actors with an interest in retaining government intervention.
How can we distinguish empirically between retrenchment, resistance, and redeployment? First, retrenchment should be associated with a reduction or abolition of institutions of industrial policy, as previously noted, as well as the organizations that played the role of designing and implementing it. It also implies the reallocation of resources toward independent regulatory authorities and other organizations responsible for the management of competition. Resistance implies that supporters of continued intervention have the capacity to successfully resist processes driving liberalization. Empirically, this should be associated with the maintenance of institutions used to promote sectoral growth and the ongoing application of some resources allocated to these tasks.
In contrast, redeployment proposes that another choice is available to domestic coalitions of actors: targeting sectors unaffected by the mechanisms driving liberalization. Empirically, this implies the retention of sectoral targeting but a shift in the allocation of human, budgetary, and institutional resources toward the insulated area of governmental activity. Figure 1 outlines the argument and contrasts it with the outcomes of retrenchment and resistance. 
Redeployment in Japan's Political Economy
In the previous section, I summarized the evidence in support of retrenchment and resistance. I also proposed that governments can retain and redeploy institutions used to shape outcomes in economic markets. In this section, I introduce evidence from the energy sector in support of the retention and redeployment hypothesis. Two steps are required to establish the plausibility of a politics of redeployment. First, it is necessary to demonstrate that the pressures for economic liberalization on the sector are limited, thereby showing that the conditions are present under which retention/redeployment can occur. Second, it is necessary to show that resources have been retained and redeployed toward this area of public policy. I have noted that three important causes of economic liberalization are identified in the case of Japan: pressure from international institutions, pressure from the United States, and changes in the policy preferences of domestic Japanese firms. The energy sector has been largely insulated from these. First, the energy sector has not been an explicit focus of multilateral trade negotiations that served to eliminate barriers to trade in goods and services, although negotiations over trade in environmental goods and services in the uncompleted Doha Round have implications for energy use. Concerns over security of energy supplies--driven by the growth in demand for coal, oil products, and (more recently) natural gas in the advanced industrial states, coupled with inadequate supplies available domestically within most of these countries-left the energy sector insulated from negotiations rounds under the GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. Exceptions to multilateral trade rules are also allowed for reasons of national security. Further, major net oil exporters were not members of the original GATT framework (the United States became a net oil importer in 1948), meaning there was little pressure from producers to force open markets in oil-importing states nor any reasons to do so given robust demand for fossil fuels (Desta 2003; UNCTAD 2000) .
This does not mean that multilateral disciplines governing trade in goods and services and flows of capital are irrelevant to the energy sector. Environmental externalities are recognized as a legitimate area for national policy under Article 20 of GATT/WTO, meaning governments can introduce measures to combat climate change and energy security only if these do not "constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade" (Hufbauer, Chamovitz, and Kim 2009) . Policies designed to mitigate externalities associated with the burning of fossil fuels or oil price volatility therefore remain a legitimate target of national policy so long as they do not discriminate against the like of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633 products of nondomestic producers (Assuncao and Zhan 2002; Galeotti and Kemfert 2004) ; subsidies supporting innovation in energy and other sectors can be used to improve the competitiveness of firms, even within this constraint (Lodefalk and Storey 2005; Melendez-Ortiz 2005) .
The second factor enabling the redeployment of organizational and budgetary resources in Japan toward the energy sector is that it was not an important focus of bilateral trade negotiations between Japan and its major trading partners. Voluntary export restraints (VERs), for example, through which the Japanese government imposed limits on exports to the United States and elsewhere, focused on broad product categories such as steel and textiles in addition to specific product types such as plywood, footwear, bearings, and umbrellas (McClenahan 1991; Turner 1983 ). They did not focus on energy-related goods and services.
One index for measuring the importance of the energy sector in its bilateral negotiations with the United States over barriers to trade and investment is the frequency with which the US government takes up energy-related issues in negotiations between the two countries. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) tracked changes in barriers to investment and trade through its National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. This focuses on structural issues, such as intellectual property rights and the powers of the competition authority, as well as sector-specific demands made by the US government. The estimates therefore represent a record of the macro-and microeconomic trade-and investment-related concerns of the US government toward Japan.
A review of USTR annual reports between 1990 and 2006 shows that the energy sector emerged as a trade and investment issue; however, its importance was minor. Pressure on Japan over trade and investment was institutionalized through the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), launched in 1989. The SII led the Japanese government to make institutional changes in savings and investment, land policies, distribution, unfair business practices, pricing, and competition. It also committed in 1991 to investigate anticompetitive practices in autos, auto parts, glass, and paper. Energy was not a focus of bilateral trade and investment negotiations under the SII (USTR 1990 (USTR -2006 .
The SIT was superseded in 1993 by the US-Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership, which shifted to focus on procurement, regulatory reform, sectoral initiatives, and standards and aimed to directly assist US fIrmS operating in Japan. Under this initiative, Japan's falling level of purchases of US metallurgical coal was raised in 1994, as was the procurement practices of electricity companies in 1995; however, these represented only two of nineteen sector-specific areas of focus of the US government in 1995.
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.70.40.11, on 13 Feb 2019 at 03:00:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
The US government made more significant representations to Japan as part the Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy, launched in 1997 with the goal of increasing market access for US goods and services. The US government initially targeted four areas: telecommunications, medical devices and pharmaceuticals, housing, and financial services. Energy was added in 1998, which coincided with the entrance of the US gas and electricity firm Enron into the Japanese market. Enron declared bankruptcy in 2001, however, and energy dropped from the bilateral trade agenda in 2006.
Evidence shows that the liberalization of Japan's energy sector, where it occurred, was not driven by pressure from the United States or from international organizations. Rather, the most significant cause was the changing preferences of domestic actors themselves. Liberalization of imports and exports of crude and crude products, for example, was caused by domestic responses to the undermining of existing regulations by the price shocks of the 1970s and 1980s. Liberalization of barriers to market entry in the former regulated monopolies in the electricity and gas sectors was also affected by domestic demands for lower energy prices in order to improve Japan's international competitiveness and not because of pressure from Japan's trading partners. This was noted by the Japanese government in response to the National Trade Estimate of 1999, when it stated that "under the 'Three-Year Program for the Promotion of Deregulation' the Government of Japan has been working on the deregulation of energy sector as its own problem from even before the establishment of the Energy Working Group with a view to improving efficiency while considering the public merits of the universal service, energy security and preservation of global environment" (MOFA 2000) . The subsequent collapse of Enron and the electricity crisis in California slowed the liberalization of Japan's electricity market (Scalise 2009 ).
Third, the internationalization of Japanese firms and the opening of Japan's capital markets was an important cause of the retrenchment of industrial policy in Japan, as noted earlier. Internationalization, coupled with capital market opening, reduced capital scarcity, which had underpinned private sector cooperation in industrial planning. Many firms shifted production outside Japan and used international capital markets rather than domestic banks for financing. Firms also became less cooperative in state planning as their international competitiveness increased (Uekusa 1988; Vogel 2006; Schaede 2008) .
In the energy sector, in contrast, there remains a business-government consensus about the benefits of state intervention. This can be seen in the level of firm participation in deliberative councils within MITI/METI. of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633
These councils incorporate the interests of firms, consumer representatives, journalists, and civil society representatives. There are ten major committees within MITI/METI that incorporate the interests of firms and others when designing energy policy. These cover policies on both the fuels and demand side, as well as technical problems associated with standard setting. The committees traditionally use a consensus-based decisionmaking model, meaning that recommendations are the consensus position of the most important socioeconomic actors with interests in the energy sector (Schwartz 1998) . Of the 244 members from these ten major committees, 41 percent are industry representatives, while 43 percent are academics/researchers, 6 percent are from local and central government bodies, and 10 percent are representatives drawn from civil society. The consensus positions released within these committees consistently demonstrate support for ongoing intervention by the government in favor of public policy and competition goals.'
There is also a public policy justification for continuing to intervene in the energy sector. Estimates for electricity generation costs by fuel type show major fossil fuel (coal, gas) generation costs are lower than those for renewables, excluding nuclear power. (See Table 1 .) Generating capacity is also weighted toward fossil fuels, as it is in the other advanced industrial states. This means that renewable energy sources are not competitive absent government intervention and will not be deployed at a scale required to curb greenhouse gas emissions associated with the burning of fossil fuels. This ensures that government remains an important source of support for energy research, development, and deployment.
The fragmented effect of multilateral trade and investment agreements, lack of pressure from the United States, and ongoing demand for government intervention mean that redeployment to the energy sector is possible. How, though, do we know if it has occurred? To explore this question, I examine data drawn from the national budget, bureaucratic employment, and legal changes. I fmd that the lead ministry with delegated responsibility for designing and implementing industrial policy retained and redeployed resources toward sectors of the economy unthreatened by the mechanisms that led to the retrenchment of industrial policy. This includes support for small and medium-sized enterprises and ongoing support for the aircraft and aerospace industries (Elder 2003) . It is most significant, however, in the area of energy-related investments.
Public investment in energy matters because it includes both demandand supply-side measures. This implies intervention across a wide number of sectors-for example, autos and transport, building and construction, and consumer goods-in addition to renewables and other supply of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.70.40.11, on 13 Feb 2019 at 03:00:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms measures. Further, while intervention is designed to manage environmental and energy security-related externalities associated with the consumption of fossil fuels, it increasingly seeks to promote growth and employment. Intervention in the energy sector is therefore shifting the ministry toward its traditional role of promoting international competitiveness on a sectoral basis.
Evidence suggests that retention and redeployment has also led to a distinct pattern of national spending in Japan, when compared to the other advanced industrialized states. While this measure does not include the fiscal effects of tax measures designed to shift demand for different energy sources, comparative data on spending on the research, development, and deployment of energy-related technologies show that Japan outspends the other major OECD countries as a share of national income. Together these countries represent approximately 80 percent of total global spending on energy research, development, and deployment (ERD&D).3
This cannot beexplained by a simple governmental response to energyrelated externalities: during the 1980s and 1990s, the other advanced industrialized states significantly withdrew from spending on ERD&D as oil prices fell. Yet while Japanese public investment decreased from its peak in the late 1970s, it remained an outlier in terms of investment as a share of national income through the 1980s and 1990s; between 1986, when oil prices collapsed, and 2000, annual public spending on ERD&D averaged US$3.2 billion when measured with 2009 prices in purchasing power parity (PPP) of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633
terms, This was slightly less than the United States spent, despite the much larger size of the US economy, and significantly greater than what European states spent. France, for example, averaged $725 million in annual expenditures over the same period, while Germany spent $542 million.
This high level of public investment in ERD&D holds true in aggregate terms and across most energy subsystems. Japan had the highest mean level of public spending as a share of national output in research, development, and development on energy efficiency measures between 1985-the earliest year for which data are available for the seven countries examined here-and 2008. It also allocated a higher share of national income to RD&D in fossil fuels between 1980 and 2008, as well as for nuclear fission. While ERD&D spending on hydrogen and fuel cells has only recently begun to be tracked by the International Energy Agency, in 2007 Japan also spent more than the other six major advanced industrialized countries in this area, as a ratio of total national output. The only major category where Japan spent less than others was in renewable energies, when it was outspent by Germany and the United States."
Redeployment: Budgetary Allocations
Budgetary data offer the first salient measure of the redeployment of MITI/METI organizational resources. The national budget contains the general account, special accounts, and budgets for public corporations and government agencies. Revenues flow into the general account and then are transferred to other accounts. These transfers are made to the special accounts, government bodies, and local governments.
The redeployment of budgetary resources toward energy/environment can be seen in both the general budget and the special accounts. The energy sector accounts for the largest share of discretionary spending within the general account, representing over half of total spending. Energy/environmental budgetary allocations are also funded through special accounts. The resources for these are tied to revenues from fuel imports and fuel and electricity consumption.
The redeployment of organizational resources toward the energy sector can be seen in the growth in special account funds allocations. A special account within the budget that focused specifically on the energy sector was established in 1967, when an account for coal was provided for in law. The purpose of the account was to compensate the domestic coal industry as crude and crude products began to dominate coal as a preferred industrial fuel. The special account was expanded, however, to allow the use of public funds for other purposes. In 1972, petroleum and natural gas were added to the fuels eligible for funding. In 1980, other substitutes were of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.70.40.11, on 13 Feb 2019 at 03:00:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms added to the list of legitimate use of the special account, including ethanol, solar power, and geothermal energy. In 1973, a special account drawing funds from a tax on electricity was established to facilitate nuclear power siting. Then, in 1993, energy efficiency was added. Finally, in 2007, the special accounts for electricity and those for fuels were merged into the newly titled special account for energy. The account currently mandates its use for both energy security and environmental purposes-including the strategic petroleum reserve, the exploration and production of petroleum and natural gas resources and technological innovation related to these activities, energy efficiency, and for research development-and deployment of substitutes for petroleum. (See Table 2 
Redeployment: Employees
Changes in employee numbers offer a second indicator of institutional redeployment. I code bureaus within the lead ministry responsible for industrial policy by function, distinguishing between centralized functions such as offices attached to the ministerial secretariat, offices involved in the design and implementation of trade policy, and those responsible for industrial policy in manufacturing, macroeconomic policy, external organizations and regional offices, and energy and the environment. Regional bureaus and research institutes funded by the ministry are excluded. Energy employees are identified as those employed within the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE), which is the agency within MITI/METI responsible for policy setting and regulation of the energy sector, as well as in bureaus within the main organization working on energy and environmental issues (Gyosei Kikozu 2002, 290--294) .5
The first thing to note is that total employee numbers within the ministry have fallen, consistent with the retrenchment hypothesis. Total employment within the ministry, including external and regional bureaus, fell from 12,019 employees in 1960 to 8,958 in 2000, the year before a major ministerial reorganization. This represents a 25 percent reduction in employees. Much of this reduction occurred through cuts in regional bureaus; employment in the regional offices decreased from 4,055 to 2,328 employees over the same period, a fall of 43 percent. The Agency of Industrial Science and Technology also lost 674 employees, falling from 4,177 in 1960 to 3,503.
How has the distribution of employees within the central ministry changed? Between 1960 and 2000, the number of employees focused on trade policy and energy-related policymaking increased as a ratio of total employees. This represented not only a fall in employee numbers within the minister's secretariat and bureaus focused on sectoral planning. Along with a change in the denominator came an increase in the total number of employees allocated to the energy sector, consistent with the redeployment hypothesis. The number of employees located in bureaus working on the design and implementation of sectoral industrial policy in manufacturing and services fell from 868 to 835 employees between 1960 and 2000, after peaking at 937 in [1965] [1966] 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Source: Calculations by author. Data drawn from Gyosei Kikozu.
Note: See main text and appendix for coding rules.
A simple comparison of the distribution of employees after 2001 is difficult, given the reorganization of Japan's ministries and agencies: of the four bureaus focusing on industrial promoting that were retained, two were made responsible for implementing cross-sectoral policies, while the other two remained focused on sectoral planning. The data nevertheless suggest that the percentage of employees engaged in energy policymaking has continued to rise over time. Energy-related policymaking bureaus had 31.3 percent of total employees in 2001, increasing to 35.4 percent in 2008, the largest share of policymaking within MITI/METI. If we exclude central coordinating functions carried out within the minister's secretariat and compare employee numbers across trade, vertical industrial policy, horizontal industrial policy, and energy, then 41 percent of employees worked on energy-related policymaking functions in 2008. These employees are increasingly located within the central ministerial departments, and not only in the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy; the Industrial Technology and Environment Bureau, for example, was created as part of the 2001 reorganization and retains departments promoting recycling and environmental policy. A number of employees in departments focused on technological innovation also have a role in the energy sector.
Redeployment: Laws and Regulations
A third indicator of redeployment lies in legal and policy change. I track legal changes in terms of the absolute number of laws and their content.
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.70.40.11, on 13 Feb 2019 at 03:00:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms I find an increase in the number of laws targeting the energy sector on the demand and supply side and extending to a wide range of industries. The growth in laws initially responded to the public policy goals of managing security and environmental externalities associated with the consumption of fossil fuels. More recent changes also focus on promoting economic growth and employment.
Intervention in the energy sector has long been a component of industrial planning. MITI/METI's predecessor, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI), shaped energy flows before the Pacific war. Coal was supported in the early years of the twentieth century for reasons of both growth and employment (Samuels 1987) . In the oil industry, prewar policies focused on ensuring the security of petroleum supplies by increasing national control over the production and distribution of fuels. An important cause of intervention was the calculation that Japan was militarily vulnerable because of the lack of domestic energy resources (Barnhart 1988 ).
The energy sector remained a focus of industrial planning in the postwar period. A system of priority production for coal was implemented through the newly created Coal Agency within the MCI, MITI/METI's predecessor, which replaced the Fuel Bureau of the prewar era (Johnson 1982, 179) . Capital designed to finance increased investments in coal production was provided through the Financial Reconstruction Bank (FRB) (Samuels 1987, 94) . Electricity was also a focus of MITI/METI policy in support of economic growth (Kikkawa 2004) . Oil continued to invite government intervention. The Petroleum Industries Law (PIL) of 1962 applied regulatory, trade, and other measures to increase the share of Japanese firms in the domestic market for oil and oil products. Subsidies were also provided to firms exploring for and producing oil internationally.
The overall level of intervention grew from the 1970s, if measured by the number of laws, both as a way to manage local pollution issues and as a result of the twin oil shocks of 1973-1974 and 1978-1979 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 have served to increase, rather than decrease, government intervention. A law on energy efficiency was first introduced in 1979 in response to instability in oil markets, for example, and is designed to increase the efficiency of energy in the industrial sector. It has expanded over time both in scope and purpose. The Law on Energy Efficiency has been revised six times since enactment, including in 1998 following the signing of the Kyoto Protocol (Japan ratified the protocol in 2002) when it incorporated energy efficiency standards for autos and appliances. This expanded the reach of MITI/METI across a wider range of industries and products: the number of product categories covered under the law expanded from nine product categories to twenty-one by 2009. The law also requires engineers in charge of energy management to be placed in all significant manufacturing plants and makes them responsible for lodging a mediumterm plan for energy usage with the ministry. Most importantly, the revision of the law governing the lead ministry for industrial policy elevated the promotion of goals in energy/environment within its organizational mission. Article 3 of the revised version of the 2001 law defines the mission of the reorganized ministry as follows: "The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry is responsible for developing industry and the economy by improving the performance of the private sector and developing smooth trade relations. It is also responsible for planning for the stable and efficient securing of supplies of mining resources and energy."? Article 4 then identifies specific economic sectors targeted by intervention, identifying energy efficiency, fuel diversification, and other measures in addition to other sectors. This institutionalized energy and the environment as a central component of the ministry's organizational mission.
The redeployment of MITI/METI's organizational resources is also facilitated by the Basic Law on Energy, passed in 2001. The law requires the minister to prepare a national energy plan and submit it to the cabinet for approval every three years. The 2010 report cites structural changes in supply and demand in international oil markets, as well as climate change, as justification for further increasing public investments in energy markets. Numerical targets were established in 2006 further justifying medium-to long-term public investment in energy.
The strategies adopted by the state in the energy sector mirror those previously used to promote sectoral growth in manufacturing. MITI/METI has developed technology road maps on a sectoral basis and committed to injecting public funds to support private sector innovation. The range of policy areas supported by MITI/METI is broad. In the transport sector, for example, it has committed to supporting a wide range of technologies on the fuel side, including developing biofuels, promoting the use of diesel vehicles to facilitate the uptake of gas-to-liquids technology, and supporting coal-to-liquids and biomass-to-liquids research and development (R&D). MITI/METI has also committed to supporting R&D into car battery technologies and the spread of compressed natural gas (eNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) vehicles through preferential tax measures. Renewable energy is also identified for concentrated support.
Industrial policy is now explicitly linked to the potential for energy subsidies to promote industry competitiveness and economic growth. State support for energy research, development, and deployment reflects of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633 the traditional industrial policy role of the ministry in promoting national competitiveness. This link between the management of environmental and security externalities through investment in energy research, development, and deployment and the industrial policy goal of promoting firm competitiveness is also outlined explicitly in cabinet planning. The Cool Earth plan announced by the government in May 2007, for example, mandates the development by MITI/METI of a technology road map for promoting growth in the energy sector. The road map links international competitiveness with the public policy goal of reducing carbon emissions, and key technologies in which Japanese firms are identified as holding a competitive advantage relative to non-Japanese firms are targeted for state support (MITI/METI 2008) . Promoting economic growth through supporting the competitiveness of industries in the energy production and consumption sectors was also added to the 2010 national energy plan. Improving the competitiveness of Japanese firms is promoted by increasing the share of zero emissions electricity generation to 70 percent from 34 percent, improving industrial energy efficiency, and ensuring that Japanese energy-related products attain the highest global market share across product categories by 2030.
The Industrial Structure Council, the top decisionmaking body within MITI/METI charged with developing a strategic vision for the ministry and coordinating the interests of client industries and socioeconomic actors, has identified five broad areas for concentrated state intervention in the economy to promote economic growth and employment: infrastructure-related industries, next-generation energy solutions, fashion and content provision, health and medical, and next-generation technologies in its Industrial Structure Vision 2010. This completes the shift from managing energy and environmental externalities to promoting growth through energy and environmental industrial policy. The vision was created within the Industrial Competitiveness Committee, which was mandated to create a vision for industry under the Industrial Structure Council. The energy and environmental sectors are best represented both quantitatively and qualitatively within these targeted sectors. Qualitatively, the potential benefits for reducing CO 2 emissions growth is one of three criteria to identify strategic industries for state support, alongside demand elasticity in the Asia-Pacific region and business opportunities in the aging society segment of the economy. Quantitatively, the energy and environment sector is identified in two of the five major sectors of the economy for targeted support from the state: infrastructure (coal, transmission, and nuclear energy) and next-generation energy solutions (smart buildings, solar and wind power, battery technologies, smart grid, and autos).
Summary and Discussion
Governments in the advanced industrialized countries implemented a widespread program of economic liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s. Scholars have noted that the Japanese government also substantially reduced its support for particular sectors of the economy, driven by Japan's entrance into international institutions, pressure from the United States, and changes in firm characteristics that made them less reliant on support from the state. Yet the evidence I have presented suggests that changes made to Japanese industrial policy cannot be characterized as either simple retrenchment or resistance to liberalization in a limited number of sectors. Instead, the budgetary, employment, and legal/policy data I have introduced show that the lead ministry with responsibility for designing industrial policy has also retained and redeployed organizational resources toward the energy sector.
In this article I have proposed that redeployment was possible because of the insulation of the energy sector from the three most important causes of economic liberalization in Japan: entrance into multilateral organizations, pressure from the United States, and the shift away from support for sectoral intervention by Japanese firms. The ongoing intervention of the government in support of sectoral targets in the energy sector was also possible because of continued industry support for intervention.
This process of retention and redeployment was not wholly unconstrained by the causes of liberalization. Measures introduced to promote the competitiveness of firms in the energy sector, for example, have the potential to be in conflict with WTO rules (Hutbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim 2009) . Redeployment into energy also represented the expansion in market intervention in an existing policy area, rather than the adoption of a wholly new policy area. This suggests that outcomes may also have been conditioned by historical legacy; the organization with competency for supporting industrial policy expanded into an area in which it already had institutional capacity-the energy sector-rather than adopting a wholly new area.
The Japanese government's justification for continuing to intervene in the energy sector was initially tied to managing externalities, most importantly the need to ensure security of energy supplies and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. I have shown that the rationale for state intervention has expanded over time, however, to include the promotion of economic growth and employment. The retention and redeployment of resources toward the energy sector also had important distributive effects. It led to a higher share of public investment in the research, development, and deployment of energy technologies than in the other of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633 advanced industrialized states, which cut public investments more drastically than did Japan in the 1980s and 1990s as oil prices fell. It also meant that the lead ministry with delegated responsibility for industrial policy retained a significant share of the national budget and that firms operating in the energy sector, both on the demand and supply side, enjoyed billions of yen of transfers from the budget.
What do these findings imply for our understanding of Japan's political economy, and the broader changes in state-market relations in the advanced industrialized states? First, it is worth noting that the effectiveness of public spending as a strategy for promoting growth remains contested. Case studies suggest that public investments had mixed effects in photovoltaics and the automotive sectors (Ahman 2006; Shum and Watanabe 2007 ). Yet it is also the case that in the area of climate change-related technologies, Japanese firms' share of patent registrations worldwide is high; firms located in Japan come first in twelve of thirteen categories of climate change-related patent registrations and place second in the other category (biomass) (Dechezlepretre et al. 2009 ). While further research is required, the domination by Japanese firms of climate change-related patent registrations suggests the possibility, at least, of a causal relationship between higher public investment in energy research, development, and deployment and firm competitiveness.
Setting aside questions about how effective public spending is in promoting competitiveness in the energy sector, my findings also suggest that the causes of retrenchment from sectoral targeting have had a more fragmented effect than is commonly conceived. Rather than simply retrenching or resisting pressures for change, governments and socioeconomic actors retained and redeployed resources to sectors unaffected by the specific drivers of liberalization. Indeed, today governments in the advanced industrialized states are united in promoting industrial competitiveness by intervening in the energy sector on both the supply side, through investments in renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, and nuclear power, and on the demand side, in sectors such as automotive and transport, construction, and large industrial users. Expenditures in energy research, development, and deployment, justified in terms of climate change mitigation and adaptation, for example, amount to tens of billions of dollars annually; a 2009 estimate found, for example, that approximately 15 percent of the US$2.8 trillion of fiscal spending ($420 billion) implemented by the G-20 states was targeted at national measures designed to reduce GHG emissions (Robins, Clover, and Singh 2009) .
This simultaneous reemergence of government intervention in the energy sector undoubtedly reflects a common response to the climate of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007633 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.70.40.11, on 13 Feb 2019 at 03:00:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms change problem. Yet it also suggests that governments not only retain the capacity to intervene, but are also looking abroad to successful policies adopted internationally when choosing how to promote specific industries or technologies. These leave open the possibility that rather than leading to government retrenchment, as proposed by Beth Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett (2006) and others, governments may be learning and emulating one another as they increase intervention in the energy sector in order to promote sectoral growth and employment. 
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3. Aggregate spending on energy-related research, development, and deployment. See the International Energy Agency data handbook for a summary of the items included. Summarized data are in US dollars, constant prices, constant PPP, reference year 2007, millions. Data and data handbook are available from http://wds.iea.org/WDS/tableviewer/document.aspx?FileId=ll48 (accessed July 25,2009).
4. Calculations by author. Energy-related data are drawn from the International Energy Agency Energy Technology RD&D Database, 2010 edition. Gross domestic product (GDP) figures are drawn from the national accounts data of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Calculations were made using annual figures expressed in national currencies at current prices (accessed July 24, 2011).
5. It is likely that this measure underestimates total employees committed to the design and implementation of policies in trade and energy, as it excludes employees located within bureaus who are ostensibly focused on other tasks but who work on energy-related issues. Department-level data are not available, however, making this the best available measure of changes in employee allocation.
6. Calculated from the horei legal database (accessed October 14, 2009). Measuring the growth of new laws probably underestimates the organizational redeployment toward energy/environmental, as it excludes the revision of existing laws that have served to expand authority of the ministry in energy-related public policy.
7. Article 3, Keizai Sangyo Sho Setchi Ho [Act establishing the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry).
